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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to provide an overview of some of the main areas of debate that have emerged
in recent years at the interface between theories of justice and health care. First, the paper consi-
ders various positions as to what the index of justice with respect to health ought to be. It warns
on practical and principled grounds against conceptual inflation of the notion of "health" as it
appears in theories of distributive justice. Second, it considers how various standards according to
which goods ought to be distributed in a just society apply to debates within health care.
RÉSUMÉ
Le présent article vise à fournir un aperçu de certains des principaux débats qui ont émergé ces
dernières années entre les théories de la justice et la réflexion sur les soins de santé. L'article exa-
mine tout d'abord des arguments qui prennent position sur la définition de la justice dans des
contextes de santé. Une mise en garde se fondant sur des motifs pratiques et théoriques est ensuite
émise à l'encontre d'une inflation conceptuelle de la notion de « santé » telle que celle-ci apparaît
dans les théories de la justice distributive. L'article examine en second lieu comment divers stan-
dards relatifs à la redistribution juste des biens s'arriment aux débats en soins de santé.
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INTRODUCTION
A sea change has occurred in the preoccupations of health ethi-
cists in recent years. Whereas medical ethics had previously been
dominated by discussions of micro-level decision-making contexts, be
it in the area of clinical ethics (e.g. at what point is the line of “med-
ical futility” crossed in the case of patient x ?), research ethics (e.g.
how do we ascertain that the consent provided by research subject x
meets the standard of free and informed consent ?) and distributive
justice (should limited medical resources be provided to patient x or
patient y), there is a move to macro-level ethical-philosophical dis-
cussions of the broader institutional and political contexts against the
backdrop of which these questions are set (Anand, Peter and Sen,
2006).
The move to a more political approach to health ethics has been
due to a number of factors. First, it has become increasingly obvious
that micro-level ethical decision-making contexts are heavily constrained
by broader institutional contexts. When ethical reflection focuses on
the former rather than the latter, there is the risk that the real determi-
nants of decisions escape ethical scrutiny (Cribb, 2005).
Second, a number of factors have contributed to researchers taking
an independent interest in the politics of health. Pressures that are
increasingly being brought to bear upon publicly funded health systems
such as Canada’s, and the continued inability of more market-driven
systems like the United States’ to respond adequately to the medical
needs of their members, have promoted much reflection on the require-
ments of justice in the area of health-care, and the relationship between
the value of justice and that of efficiency (Faden and Powers 2006).
Other macro-level contexts have also captured the ethical imagination
of researchers. For example, it has become clear that the concepts of
“health” and “illness” far from being objective, scientific, “value-neu-
tral” notions, are heavily invested with often unspoken cultural and
moral assumptions that need to be unearthed and discussed.
Ethical scrutiny must also be devoted to a number of crucial polit-
ical issues: for example, what are the “drivers” of medical and biotech-
nological research, and what should these drivers be ? Or again, what
role should the public have in shaping policy in the area of health care,
and what form should public participation and consultation take ?
This paper seeks to provide an overview of some of the main areas
of debate that have emerged in recent years at the interface between
theories of justice and health care. It is by no means exhaustive. It
merely seeks to identify some main lines of discussion, and to trace
their interrelations. The hope is that researchers will be able to use
it as a springboard to identify and pursue new research avenues, or
to deepen existing lines of inquiry.
WHAT IS HEALTH ?
Many institutional and political debates have to do with the ethi-
cally best ways in which to distribute health, or at least the resources
that are necessary in order to access health. Lurking in the back-
ground of these discussions are taken-for-granted conceptions of what
health is. The direction that these debates take, and to a degree the
conclusions that they arrive at, are driven by these tacit conceptions.
An example to fix ideas: if what is meant by health is simply the
absence of serious illness, then the requirements of fairness in the
allocation of health-care resources will be quite different, and poten-
tially significantly less onerous, than they would be were health to
be thought of more ambitiously as requiring a certain level of social,
psychological and physical thriving.
The move towards a more socially and politically reflective health
ethics has given rise to a greater awareness among health ethicists
that the very definition of health is not an ethically innocent exer-
cise. Almost all theorists agree that health is a multi-dimensional con-
cept, and so definitions of health involve in part decisions about what
to prioritize among the goods included within the range of the term.
And given the importance that health has on the public policy agen-
da, including (or excluding) a good from the purview of health has
an impact on the relative priority which the good will enjoy relative
to other public policy objectives. There are therefore strong incen-
tives to “overload” the concept of health to have it cover just about
every item on the public policy agenda. We therefore cannot look for
an “objective”, “scientific” conception of what health is, and then
spell out the ethical implications of that conception. Ethics is always
already present in our definitions of health, and so debates about how
to understand health are already full-bloodedly ethical debates.
Two criteria are standardly invoked by participants in this debate
in order to help organize the search for an adequate definition.
Unfortunately, these two criteria pull in different directions, militat-
ing for quite different understandings of what health is. First, there
is an appreciation that conceptions of health should be inclusive, and
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should capture all of the phenomena that are commonly taken in ordi-
nary language as belonging to the area of health. Health according
to this criterion involves “normal” human functioning along the diver-
sity of dimensions that characterize human agents. So health connotes
physical well-being, but also to some degree psychological, cognitive
and emotional well-being as well.
On the other hand, there is a concern among theorists working at
the interface between theory and public policy that our conception of
health be operational. If health is something that must be distributed
equitably, then we must have some way of counting increments of
health, lest our deliberations about how various regimes of allocation
are performing in delivering health give rise to hopelessly indetermi-
nate judgments.
It is important to note that concerns of operationalizability have
an irreducibly ethical dimension. It is not just being able to count,
but also of laying the groundwork for ethically accountable judgments
in matters of allocation. According to theorists who emphasize the
importance of a conception of health being operationalizable, judg-
ments about relative advantage in the area of health will be irre-
deemably subjective and impressionistic unless health statuses can be
ranked cardinally, as identifiable quanta.
If we imagine conceptions of health as ranging on a continuum,
the two poles of which are represented by these two criteria, we can
organize conceptions of health that can be found in the present lit-
erature as emphasizing these two criteria to greater and lesser degrees.
At one extreme, we would find maximally capacious conceptions,
that essentially equate health with well-being. The WHO definition
would be a fairly good example: according to its 1946 constitution,
health is to be understood as “a state of complete physical, mental
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infir-
mity” (my emphasis).
At the other extreme lie the kinds of quantitative conceptions that
attempt to reduce all aspects of health to some meta-value in terms
of which they can all be given quantitative expression. Quality-adjust-
ed life years (or QALYs, disability-adjusted life years (or DALYs),
and other such measures belong to this family.
Both types of extreme conceptions appear problematic when viewed
from the point of view of the other. A partisan of a conception of
health focused on the operational will tend to find broader concep-
tions hopelessly amorphous, conceptually confused, and difficult to
use, whereas those who defend inclusive conceptions will accuse con-
ceptions based around a unit of measurement reductive, and untrue
to the full range of phenomena that we commonly include under the
rubric of health.
It is important to see however that both kinds of extreme concep-
tions are vulnerable to other criticisms as well, ones that do not depend
upon taking the rival criterion for granted. Excessively capacious con-
ceptions risk bundling together things that perspicuous judgment
would require that we distinguish. For example, it is important from
within a public health framework that we be able to maintain a dis-
tinction between health on the one hand, and determinants of health
on the other. Though this distinction is contestable and possessed of
fuzzy edges (is teenage pregnancy a health problem, or is it for con-
tingent reasons causally correlated to such problems ?), it is essential
that it not be done away with entirely within a conception of health
that is excessively inclusive.
There are other reasons to resist overly inclusive conceptions of
health, aside from their tendency to make judgments and decision-
making more difficult. For example, given the urgency that is in mod-
ern societies associated with claims made on the public policy agen-
da on the basis of health, conceptions of health that attempt to make
too many claims that might be made on behalf of individuals or
groups matters of health risk paradoxically undercutting this urgency.
The urgency associated with health claims requires that health be cir-
cumscribed in a manner that justifies its priority relative to other pub-
lic policy goals. If all public policy objectives can be folded into
health due to an overly inclusive definition, this priority is no longer
possible. This is so both for the conceptual reason that an excessive-
ly broad conception of health makes prioritizing difficult, and for the
pragmatic reason that subsuming too many policy goals under the
rubric of health risks, as it were, devaluing the currency of health
both among policy-makers and in the public generally, and squander-
ing the sense of urgency that is traditionally associated with policy
issues connected to health.
Problems associated with reductive conceptions such as QALYs
and DALYs are also legion. The idea that all states of health and ill-
ness can be uncontroversially expressed in terms of a single unit of
measurement remains unvindicated. Methodologies employed by
researchers in order to give quantitative expression to all dimensions
of health often rely upon collecting the impressions of health-care
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professionals, and so they do not avoid the charges of impressionism
and imprecision that bedevil more inclusive conceptions, or they do
so only superficially, by producing the appearance of precision.
What’s more, concerns have been raised that the kinds of calcula-
tion that these highly operationalizable conceptions lend themselves
to are deaf to considerations of justice between individuals. They tend
to be used in the context of aggregating, maximizing exercises that
do not pay much attention to distributional issues. (This point will
be returned to below).
So we seem stuck in a dilemma. On the one hand, we want the
conception of health with which we operate to capture all the phe-
nomena that should be associated with health, even if they do not
end up constituting a tidy bundle unified by some overarching meta-
value that might ultimately be quantifiable. On the other, we want,
for ethical reasons to do with accountability, to be able to make deter-
minate judgments about what policy levers are most efficacious in
generating health, and this requires that we be able to make fine-
grained comparisons.
One way of softening the dilemma is for each family of concep-
tions to take on board the criticisms that are, as it were, independ-
ent of the rival conception. So, for example, even someone who wants
no part of an excessively “scientistic” conception of health will have
to agree that it is important for a broader conception not to become
so broad as to hide from view important distinctions. The distinction
between health and social determinants of health seems in particular
an important one to hang on to. Now, it is far from being an easy
distinction to get a clear grasp of. Intuitively, it seeks to capture the
difference between states that constitute morbidity or that inevitably
lead to morbidity, on the one hand, and ones that only constitute or
contribute to ill health given certain cultural and institutional deci-
sions made by particular societies. Thus, to return to a classic exam-
ple, teenage pregnancy, while it represents a normal functioning of
the human reproductive system, correlates highly with health prob-
lems given broad civilizational decisions that have been taken over
time as to the appropriate age for procreation.
Though the distinction is intuitively clear, it becomes elusive when
particular cases are examined. As with many distinctions, it probably
operates more like a continuum than like a stark dichotomy, and where
particular states will lie will probably not be a matter than can be
settled with scientific certainty. But the fact that the distinction is
elusive should not hide the fact that such a distinction does exist.
And the awareness of such a distinction should guard against exces-
sively inclusive conceptions of health. It might also throw critical
light on the normative approach favored by CCN PPS. Indeed, though
it is important that attention be drawn to areas of public policy such
as education, housing, and the like that have an impact on health but
that have a hard time making it on to the policy agenda because they
are perceived as lying at a distance from health, it is also essential
that the claims made on behalf of these areas be backed up by plau-
sible causal accounts that allow for the measurement of impacts upon
health, narrowly construed. Thus, it is important even for the parti-
san of a capacious conception of health, and of the reach of health
policy, not to lose completely from view a more narrow conception
that targets states that would be considered as indicators of health
given any mode of social organization or cultural context.
Defenders of a quantitative conception of health must on the other
hand also be reflective about the limits of their own favored concep-
tions. In essence, they must recognize that an easily quantifiable state
should not in virtue of its ready quantifiability be deemed to belong
to the core conception just alluded to. To put it bluntly, just because
you can measure something doesn’t make it important. They must
also recognize the limits of any attempt to bring certain states into
the ambit of quantification. The method that consists in polling health-
care professionals so as to obtain a consensus of the degree of disu-
tility associated with different states risks smuggling professional and
class prejudice into what is then presented as resulting from the appli-
cation of a scientific, “objective” methodology. Finally, they must rec-
ognize the “value-ladenness” of all seemingly objective measurement
methods. All measurement tools carry assumptions about what to
measure and how to measure it, and about ways of effecting trade-
offs (Asada, 2007). These assumptions are not value-free, but rather
bring with them normative assumptions that are by their very nature
contestable.
Thus, far from being polar opposites, the richer, more inclusive
conceptions of health, and narrower, more quantifiable ones depend
upon one another to a significant degree for their plausibility. A more
capacious conception must be able to give more than simply an
impressionistic account of causal impacts of social determinants of
health upon health, but to do this they must presuppose a core con-
ception, impacts upon which can at least to some degree be meas-
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ured and ranked. And defenders of a narrow conception must acknowl-
edge that elements of a broader conception might form part of a more
narrow conception even when they are not readily quantifiable, and
that attempts at bringing them into the sphere of quantification carry
highly value-laden assumptions, ones that must be discussed and val-
idated, lest they play themselves out unnoticed by those that make
use of them.
It would be a mistake to expect that we might be able to come
up with a conception of health that best corresponds to some inde-
pendently existing state. Clearly, the decision to adopt this or that
conception of health is just that – a decision. And it is one that is
governed by normative considerations. We ask ourselves: “what are
the advantages, ethical and otherwise, to adopting one conception
rather than another ?” Among the ethical considerations that need to
be taken into account, the impact of our conception of health upon
distributional issues looms large. It is to the range of issues surround-
ing distributive justice in the area of health that we now turn.
WHAT IS JUSTICE IN HEALTH CARE ?
1
Distributive justice, that is the study of the principles that should
govern the distribution of resources in a just society, has been a cen-
tral part of post-war political philosophy. A limitation of philosoph-
ical debates on distributive justice is, however, that they have been
abstract, in the sense that less attention has been paid to the manner
in which particular goods such as health, education, housing and the
like should be allocated, than they have to the more general question
of what the general goal of resource distribution (and redistribution)
should be, and the general principles according to which such distri-
bution should occur.
Two questions have been at the heart of debates about distributive
justice. First, philosophers and other theorists have been in disagreement
about what the goal of distributive justice should be. Along what dimen-
sion should individuals be compared in order to determine whether jus-
tice obtains between them, and what is it that should be redistributed
between them when there are found to be injustices ? As the Nobel-
Prize winning economist Amartya Sen pithily put it some years ago,
equality is a laudable ideal, but equality of what ? (Sen 1980).
A second question has to do with the criteria according to which
distributions should be assessed. Should a just society aim at strict
equality ? What place should be given to individual’s own responsi-
bility in determining how well or poorly they will do ? In other words,
the first question has to do with what the goods are that public pol-
icy ought to aim for the equitable distribution of. The second ques-
tion has to do with the manner in which the good (or goods) in ques-
tion ought to be distributed.
With respect to the first question, we can identify a spectrum of
positions. At one extreme lie positions that we might term “libertar-
ian”, according to which a just society is one that ensures that basic
civil and political rights are in place for all members of society, but
that leaves the distribution of material resources, including health care,
housing, education, and the like, entirely up to the market (Nozick,
1974). The basic moral impetus at the heart of such positions is anti-
paternalism. Individuals should on this view be able on the basis of
their own preferences and values to determine how to make use of
their resources. In the area of health, for example, libertarians believe
that the operation of a just society’s institutions will give rise to the
creation of an insurance market that will present health “consumers”
with a full range of options among which they can choose in order
to best fit their circumstances. Different people value health differ-
ently among the range of goods toward which they might want to
direct their resources. Some are highly risk-averse, and might want
to choose comprehensive coverage. Others might have high tolerance
for risk, and may choose differently. Again, different people discount
the future at different rates. Some ascribe a high priority to the sat-
isfaction of present preferences, while others are more sensitive to
the need to make provision for the satisfaction of their future pref-
erences. There are a range of differences among individuals that reflect
their different values, and it is on this view just and appropriate that
people be able to make choices even within the domain of health
care that reflects their legitimate differences. That this way of distrib-
uting the good in question will give rise to inequalities is to be expect-
ed, and to some degree, desired, for these inequalities are simply a
reflection of the different weights attached by different individuals to
different goods.
More reflective libertarians recognize that there will inevitably be
areas of market failure. The public nature of certain goods, that is
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the fact that people cannot be excluded from them once they are pro-
duced (security and clean air are among the most important public
goods) means that the market will not produce them reliably. If such
goods are to be had at all, the state must produce them, or at the
very least incentivize their production by private actors. In their view,
the market will not necessarily resolve all coordination problems, which
is why the state is seen by some as having an ineliminable role to
play in setting up institutions that will produce and distribute goods
efficiently (Heath, 2001).
Many libertarians have also accepted that a concern for the future
freedom of children must to some degree dictate that the state pay for
the educational system. Indeed, though they recognize that different
parents may value education differently, their choices have an impact
upon determinate others, namely children. Even the fairly minimal
state that libertarians privilege requires that the state prevent harm
being done by some to others. This justifies in the eyes of some
philosophers and economists, otherwise quite confident in the mar-
ket’s ability to allocate goods equitably and efficiently, a responsibil-
ity on the state’s part to see to the equitable distribution of goods,
such as education, pertaining to the welfare of children (Friedman
1962, Lomasky 1987).
Moving along the spectrum, we find theorists who believe that the
libertarian’s emphasis on choice is defensible only against a back-
ground of fair distributions of resources. It is on their view very well
to celebrate individuals’ ability to determine how they will lead their
lives according to their preferences, but fairness only obtains if indi-
viduals have equal access to resources with which to make these
choices and attempt to bring them to fruition. A just society should
therefore according to this second view distribute resources fairly.
Talk of resources is still quite abstract, and the question therefore
arises of what the resources are that a just society ought to distrib-
ute fairly. According to the most influential formulation of this posi-
tion, that of John Rawls (1971), there are three distinct kinds of
resources, called “primary goods”, that ought to be at the heart of a
society’s institutions of distributive justice. These are goods that any
rational person would need, no matter what particular choices she
would then go on to make as to how to lead her life.
Let me elaborate the Rawlsian perspective a bit further. First, there
are the civil and political liberties that libertarians, as we have seen,
had viewed as exhaustive of the domain of justice. It is clear that
these have to be distributed equally. Second, there are material
resources, that Rawls equates to money. In Rawls’ highly influential
view, a just society should not aim to distribute material resources
equally. Nor however should it allow the market simply to allocate
resources. Rather, distribution of material resources should satisfy
what he called the “difference principle”: material inequalities should
be allowed if they improve the material situation of the least well-
off. In other words, if allowing the luckiest or most talented mem-
bers of society to benefit from their luck and talent creates incen-
tives that end up creating more resources for everyone, including the
least well-off, then these inequalities are deemed acceptable, and may
even be required.
Finally, in Rawls’ view, members of a just society should benefit
from fair equality of opportunity. Opportunities are understood as
access to desirable roles and positions. A just society should ensure
that all have an equal chance at such roles and positions, and it should
also attempt to neutralize those circumstances that tend to “tilt the
playing field” in ways that give some people more of a chance to
access these positions, even when formal equality of opportunity
obtains.
While Rawls’ formulation of the resource-centered position has
been enormously influential, it does not provide clear guidance on
the question of how particular resources ought to be distributed.
Though Rawls’ theory marks an important advance in political phi-
losophy in that it integrates the thought that there are a diversity of
types of goods to be distributed by a just society, talk of “rights and
liberties”, “resources”, and “opportunities” remains quite abstract, at
a significant remove from particular goods such as education, health,
and the like.
That Rawls’ theory underdetermines the way in which particular
goods can be distributed can be appreciated by looking at debates
couched within a Rawlsian vocabulary, that have attempted to draw
conclusions in specific policy domains from the abstract theory. For
example, it might be argued that education is the type of good that
falls entirely under the purview of the “difference principle”. To the
extent that the private funding of education increases the total amount
of resources available to the educational system, and that the ensu-
ing surplus is used in a manner that ensures that the least well-off
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are as well-off as they can be as compared to any other system, then
justice would seem to permit, perhaps even to require, a two-track
educational system.
Others have however argued that the “correct” Rawlsian principle
under which to place the resource of education is the principle that
seeks to ensure real equality of opportunity (Weinstock 2007). Indeed,
it could be argued that educational equality is so central to the abil-
ity of a society to ensure equal opportunity that it should constitute
a central public policy objective, even if in so doing we end up
decreasing the total amount of resources available to the system, and
even if the least well-off find themselves in absolute (though not in
relative) terms less well-off than they would under an appropriately
designed two-track system.
In the area of health, similar disagreements can be observed. The
most influential extrapolation of Rawls’ resource-based theory into
the area of health care has been due to Norman Daniels (1995). In
Daniels’s view, health care should be thought of within the Rawlsian
framework as intimately connected with the idea of fair equality of
opportunity. Differentials in health matter because they can lead to
people having quite radically different opportunity ranges. Health care
provision should be aimed at people being possessed of roughly equal
ranges of opportunities. Note that this does not require that people
have equal access to health care. The goal of fair equal opportunity
might very well be attainable without equal access to health care.
There may in Daniels’ view be threshold effects at work here. That
is, it could be that equal opportunity is attained as long as all mem-
bers of society have secure access to an adequate level of care.
Additional increments of care may be subject to marginal diminish-
ing utility, at least as far as access to opportunity is concerned.
It is important to note that in his recent reformulation of his the-
ory (Daniels 2007), Daniels has moved away from thinking of the
distribuans in the area of health as being health care. Instead, he has
argued that a just society should be concerned with all of the social
determinants of health, and not fetishize those institutions that explic-
itly deliver health services. This much more inclusive conception of
what justice in the distribution of health-related resources involves
comes close to affirming that a just society is a healthy society. By
adopting a maximally inclusive view of what is involved in produc-
ing health, Daniels has arguably reduced the theory of justice in the
allocation of health resources to a theory of justice, tout court.
Resource egalitarians have been criticized, most notably by
Amartya Sen (1999) and by Martha Nussbaum (2000), for being insuf-
ficiently sensitive to the differences between individuals’ capacities
to transform resources into functionings. In their view, we care about
the kinds of resources that are at the heart of Rawls’ view because
of what they allow us to do. Yet different individuals will, because
of social or personal circumstance, be quite differently situated in
their abilities to make use of the resources with which they are pro-
vided in order to develop their capacities. The view developed by Sen
and Nussbaum is therefore that what ought to be allocated fairly is
not just resources, but capabilities. When people have an adequate
range of capabilities, they will be able on the basis of their values
and preferences to choose to actualize some capabilities rather than
others into actual functionings. If a just society is one that seeks to
provide individuals with the wherewithal required to conceive of and
to actually be able to carry out a life worth living according to their
own lights, then we should aim to distribute capabilities fairly, not
just resources.
The capabilities approach has been embraced quite widely in the
area of public health and of international development. At the same
time, it must be recognized that its implications for the distribution
of health care are quite indistinct. Should health be viewed, in a more
limited manner, as among the circumstances that allow people to
extend the range of their capabilities ? In this case, the logic would
be quite similar to that which we have already seen in Daniels’ case.
Distributive justice would require that individuals be provided with
health care resources to the point that they have adequate sets of
capabilities. Or, alternatively, should adequate ranges of capabilities
– cognitive, physical, emotional – be viewed as part of health ? These
two alternative ways of drawing Sen and Nussbaum’s theory out into
the area of health have quite different policy implications. The first,
as in Daniels’ original way of formulating his project, can be satis-
fied by the relatively modest goal of removing inequalities in access
to health care that act as obstacles to fairness in the allocation of sets
of capacities. The second is much more ambitious, and would require
that a just society view the attainment of a full range of capabilities
across the full range of human experience as in itself an objective
for health care.
Finally, positions labeled as “welfarist” (Arneson 2000, Cohen
1989) hold that a just society ought to attempt to equalize citizens’
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opportunities for welfare. Resources, capabilities, opportunities are all
freedom concepts. That is, they are all ways of specifying goods that
people must have at their disposal in order to exercise meaningful
agency. Of course, the exercise of agency can make people’s lives go
well if their choices and actions have positive consequences for them,
and poorly if the reverse happens. Now, to be sure, how a person’s
choices turn out depends upon the quality of those choices and the
prudence (or lack thereof) that people manifest in their exercise of
agency. But it also depends to some degree at least on factors that lie
entirely outside the agent’s control, namely on luck. Welfarists believe
that a just society should make people’s welfare to as great a degree
as possible insensitive to the operation of luck, and as sensitive as
possible to those factors over which people can exercise responsibili-
ty. It must in other words equalize opportunities for welfare.
Why not simply opt for a more thoroughgoing welfare egalitarian-
ism, one that simply attempts to equalize welfare, regardless of whether
obstacles to welfare come from the operation of luck or from an indi-
vidual’s failure adequately to exercise his agency ? The answer should
be fairly clear: the attempt to overcome all obstacles to the achieve-
ment of welfare is by definition a Sisyphean undertaking, and what’s
more, any attempt to embody it in policy would risk generating per-
verse incentives. Why exercise prudence, when the state will treat my
failure to do well just as generously if it stems from my choices or
whether bad luck is to blame. Thus, a focus on welfare as the egal-
isandum of a theory of justice quite naturally gives rise to an empha-
sis on the equalization of the effects of luck. As we will be consid-
ering luck-egalitarianism in some depth below, I put off its discussion
to this later point.
One thing should be quite clear at this point. Theories of justice
pitched at a high level of abstraction do not provide us with ready-
made ways in which to settle relevant philosophical disputes. First, as
we have seen in the case of education, they do not automatically gen-
erate an answer to the question of whether a specific good ought to
be subjected to egalitarian principles, or whether it is the kind of good
that can be distributed according to the vagaries of market processes
once background conditions have been equalized. In other words, given
that all theories of justice assume that there is some set of background
conditions (resources, luck, capabilities) that must be equalized as a
condition for other social processes to be seen as morally legitimate,
they do not provide us with a ready set of tools to determine whether
a specific good should be thought of as belonging to the background,
or to the set of goods that need not be equalized.
Second, they do not provide us with a perspicuous specification
of the goods in question. Milton Friedman famously opined that there
is a distinction between education and schooling, the latter being
merely an instrument for the former, which should be the real object
of the state’s concern (Friedman 1962: 86). Yet there is a tendency
for theories of justice in the area of education to focus on the just
delivery of schooling rather than of education.
Similarly in the area of health, theorists and policy-makers have
had a tendency to equate health with those services delivered by insti-
tutions that are narrowly defined as lying in the health sector. This
perspective leads theorists to focus on the allocation of resources with-
in the health-care system, the rules governing trade-offs among health-
care goods as defined by the health-care system, and at the most
macro level, with the way in which macro-budgetary allocations might
be made as between the health-care system and other public policy
sectors (see for example Dworkin 2000).
Friedman observed many years ago that schooling is just an instru-
ment serving what ought to be seen as the goal of public policy,
namely education. It is thus in his view an error to focus exclusive-
ly on justice in the area of educational resources, narrowly under-
stood. Rather, we should look at the totality of instruments that con-
tribute to, or detract from a child’s education in public policy debates.
Similarly, it has been argued by an increasing range of voices that
the health-care system should not be viewed as the focus of theories
of justice in the area of health, but just as one among a variety of
instruments and determinants of the health states of a population. A
theory of justice in the area of health that came to focus on the total-
ity of public policy levers that impact on the population’s health would
have a very different logic from one that focused on health-care as
one among a variety of goods that agents must have at their dispos-
al to be able to meaningfully exercise their agency (as in Daniels’
original formulation of his theory). Health would be conceived, to
employ the jargon of theories of distributive justice, as an end rather
than a resource. Allocation of resources and policy decisions more
broadly within all public policy areas, including the health-care sys-
tem, but not limited to it, would be judged in function of the contri-
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bution they make to health. An interesting area that reflects this refo-
cusing of theories of justice with respect to health has been with
respect to the evaluation of egalitarian policies. In the wake of the
Whitehall studies, that tended to show that there is some correlation
between health and equality, inequality seeming to correlate with
worse health-states even for those who find themselves privileged by
unequal distributions of resources, there has been a flurry of activi-
ty seeking to determine how different distributional regimes affect
health (Daniels 2006).
Taking a step back, we can see that there are two debates about
health that cut across one another, and that are both importantly rel-
evant to the way in which health fits into the purview of theories of
justice. First, there is the definitional debate touched upon in the first
section, which is constituted by partisans of a narrower, more quan-
tifiable conception of health on the one hand, and partisans of a more
inclusive, holistic approach on the other. Second, there is the debate
as to whether theories of justice should view health narrowly as a set
of identifiable resources, largely allocated by the health-care system,
or whether health should be seen as a benchmark on the basis of
which all areas of public policy are evaluated. That these two debates
are distinct can be seen by observing that settling one does not auto-
matically settle the other. Thus, for example, one can argue that all
public policy areas ought to be evaluated with respect to their impact
on health, while restricting those impacts to health narrowly con-
strued. In practice, it is, however, likely that there will be affinities
between the broader approaches to both debates on the one hand, and
the narrower ones on the other. That is, it is more natural, once one
has decided to examine the impact of all public policies upon health,
to focus on a broad conception of health, and conversely, to focus on
a narrow conception once one has decided to limit one’s purview to
the area of narrowly-defined health care resources.
2
It was mentioned earlier that theories of distributive justice focus
on two interrelated questions. The first has to do with the goal of
distributive justice. What is the dimension along which we should be
treating people equitably ? A second question has to do with the prin-
ciple in function of which we ought to be distributing the goods that
a society’s institutions of distribution and redistribution ought to be
allocating.
Two debates seem relevant from the point of view of the devel-
opment of an adequate theory of distributive justice in the area of
health. First, a very complex debate has been occupying philosophers
and social theorists as to the conception of equity that ought to be
employed as a criterion to evaluate the distribution of a given good.
Let me distinguish four positions:
1) Equality: This principle simply requires that the good be dis-
tributed equally, or as close to equally as is practicable.
2) The Difference Principle: This principle, associated with the
work of John Rawls, requires that a good be distributed equally, unless
an unequal distribution can be seen to be to the advantage of the
least well-off.
2) Sufficientarianism: As has already been seen, this principle
claims that equity requires that an ethical priority be given in distrib-
uting a resource to ensuring that no individual falls below a thresh-
old deemed to be sufficient. Inequalities that may obtain once the
threshold of sufficiency is achieved for all are seen as being of no
moral importance (Frankfurt, 1987).
4) Prioritarianism: This principle (Parfit 1997) holds that in dis-
tributing resources the interests of the least well-off should be given
some degree of priority. The position differs from the latter among
other things in that it does not specify a threshold beyond which rel-
ative positions of individuals with respect to a good cease to matter.
Clearly, each one of these positions can be employed to develop
a prima facie plausible view of what is required ethically in the dis-
tribution of goods in the area of health. Some might hold that there
is irreducible importance that certain goods be distributed equally,
even when both aggregate gains and gains for the least well-off could
be achieved by allowing some degree of inequality. Equality with
respect to the good in question would stand as an independent moral
constraint preventing any total improvement in a society’s position
with respect to a good that was purchased at the cost of diminishing
equality. To fix ideas, John Stuart Mill once infamously argued that
though it is morally required that each citizen have a right to vote,
it does not follow that each person’s vote should weigh equally in an
election. The more educated, Mill thought, should have votes that
determine democratic outcome to a greater degree. This position is
abhorrent to the modern democratic sensibility. We have come to form
the view that equal voting rights matter not just in virtue of the result
that elections yield, but because they are an emblem of our equality
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as citizens. It would be an interesting exercise to chart how different
goods should be perceived with respect to the equality requirement.
Are they of such symbolic importance that they ought, like voting
rights, to be distributed equally independently of consequences ?
Alternatively, does equality with respect to certain goods have broad
positive consequences that might offset losses of efficiency that an
insistence upon equality might occasion more locally ? (Material
equality is seen by some as contributing to overall public health; edu-
cational equality is viewed by some as contributing to a more robust
sense of shared citizenship and equal opportunity, etc.). Are there
goods with respect to which, on the contrary, an insistence upon equal-
ity at all costs might be seen as counter-productive ?
The Canadian debate over health can be seen quite plausibly as
taking place on this terrain: are unequal health states across the pop-
ulation a token of unequal citizenship, or on the contrary should we
be ready to countenance inequality on the condition that it leads to
better health states overall ?
Among the positions that allow for departures from strict equali-
ty, some are more plausible that others when a focus on health is
introduced. Thus, for example, there is no limit in principle to the
amount of inequality that sufficientarians would allow, provided that
all people within a society find themselves above a threshold of suf-
ficiency. That this position is intuitively unacceptable can I think
be seen by the fact that, unlike some other goods, health is unavoid-
ably relational and comparative. Let us as a simplifying hypothesis
take life expectancy as an index of health. Is a life expectancy
of 75 “sufficient” ? It is if the life expectancy of the broader, refer-
ence population is, say, 80, and if there is no socio-economically
defined sub-section of the population whose life-expectancy is sig-
nificantly higher in virtue. But it is not if, for example, some seg-
ment of the population has managed to use its socio-economic sta-
tus to achieve a life-expectancy of, say, 125. Thus, sufficiency with
respect to health cannot be established on absolute terms. Whether
an individual or group meet the sufficiency standard depends upon
what health states are being achieved elsewhere in society. It is an
open question whether other specific goods delivered by public pol-
icy (education, housing, security, etc.), admit of an absolute thresh-
old of sufficiency.
Thus, when a focus on health is introduced, debate would seem
most naturally to focus around an egalitarian position on the one
hand, and a position, such as the “difference principle” and the “pri-
oritarian” position (the difference between these two last positions
need not detain us here) on the other. The plausibility of these posi-
tions would seem moreover to depend upon the position one takes
on the two debates about the nature of health and about the focus
of health-related public policy. Egalitarianism seems, all things equal,
more plausible the narrower the conception of health one adopts.
Indeed, if, for example, it is argued that all areas of public policy
impact health, the demandingness of an egalitarian theory increases
correspondingly. Of course, it would be highly simplistic to expect
that because, say, housing has an impact on health, health egalitari-
anism would require housing egalitarianism. It might be found that
a broad range of resource sets in the area of housing above a cer-
tain standard will all have the same impact upon health. Empirical
work is required in order to determine how differentials in different
policy domains impact the ability of a society to achieve equity with
respect to health outcomes, and thus, in order to determine just how
demanding health egalitarianism, understood as equality across soci-
ety with respect to health outcomes, really is. Egalitarianism with
respect to the specific goods that are allocated by the health-care
system is, conceptually and empirically, a far simpler goal, no mat-
ter how great the political obstacles to its achievement.
One further complication needs to be introduced in order to com-
plete this thumbnail sketch of the implications of contemporary the-
ories of distributive justice for discussions about allocation of
resources in the area of health. Most positions are, to use the tech-
nical parlance in vogue among philosophers, “luck-egalitarian”
(Arneson 1989). That is, they believe that significant redistribution
ought to occur within a society in order to compensate for the oper-
ation of luck, both good and bad. Some people are born in favor-
able circumstances, and are possessed either due to upbringing or
because of genetic happenstance with talents that are highly prized
in the society of which they are members. Others are born less for-
tunate, both in terms of the circumstances of their birth and as far
as their native endowments are concerned. And quite obviously, luck
affects us quite differently over the course of our lives, irrespective
of what out initial circumstances are. For example, some people are
afflicted with debilitating, painful diseases at the height of their pro-
ductive lives, while others seem to sail through life blissfully unaf-
fected by any but the most trivial ailments.
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Luck-egalitarians believe that a just society is one that to some
degree makes of the operation of luck both good and bad a collec-
tive responsibility. Resources should be distributed so that all mem-
bers of society benefit from circumstances that are immunized from
the potential ravages of bad luck. The flipside of this position how-
ever is that individuals should be held responsible from the conse-
quences of their freely undertaken choices and actions, even when
they result in quite wide resource disparities. The indolent individual
who wastes away his resources cannot justly complain when his
resources are depleted and he finds himself with no provision for the
future. He certainly has no claim against the prudent and hard-work-
ing person whose industry provides her with great riches.
On the face of it, the luck-egalitarian position would seem to gen-
erate quite a generous position in the area of the distribution of health
and health-related resources. After all, health catastrophes are often
a paradigmatic example of the operation of bad luck.
Appearances are, of course, misleading. It has been a central theme
of writing in the area of health over the course of the last generation
or so that one’s health status is also powerfully determined by lifestyle
choices (Wikler 2005). Smoking, inactivity, reckless recreational activ-
ity, be it sexual or otherwise, and a host of other factors that are well
within the individual’s area of autonomous choice are important deter-
minants of health. To the extent that public health authorities make
information available about the negative correlation between health
and such types of behaviour, can we not see one’s health state as to
a large degree the result of one’s choices rather than of brute bad
luck ? As such, should the consequences of one’s poor lifestyle choic-
es not be borne by the individual rather than by society as a whole?
There are risks moreover that as the genetic revolution advances,
the range of health states that will come to be seen as resulting from
one’s choices will broaden, crowding out the range of states that the
individual will be able to claim as resulting from brute luck. For
example, as it becomes possible to screen for an increasing set of
diseases, children born with these diseases may come to be seen by
society as having resulted from parents’ decisions not to screen, or
not to abort pregnancies where genetic abnormalities are detected, and
thus as making less of a claim upon societal resources as would have
been the case prior to the discovery of the genetic basis of many dis-
eases and of the ability accurately to screen for the presence of muta-
tions responsible for disease. To refer to the title of a book devoted
by four leading American bioethicists to the ethical implications of
genetic technology, such diseases might be in the process of moving
“from chance to choice” (Brock, Buchanan, Daniels and Wikler 2000).
The “personal responsibility” argument may enter in more insidi-
ously even in health systems that are on the face of it more commit-
ted to collective provision of health resources than others. In Canada,
for example, as the “basket” of what is considered to be “medically
necessary” shrinks under increasing budgetary pressures, a greater pro-
portion of the resources necessary for health are being left up to indi-
vidual responsibility. Individuals must provide themselves with sup-
plementary private health insurance in order to access health resources
ranging from dental care to prompt diagnostic testing. As access to
such resources comes to be seen as discretionary, failure to provide
oneself with them, and the health consequences of such failure, comes
to be seen as resulting from individuals’ imprudent choices.
A closer look reveals that it is more difficult then these argument
sketches would suggest to draw a clear red line between the effect
of choice and that of circumstance with respect to health outcomes.
To take but one example, though smoking rates have declined sharply
in modern economically advanced societies, this decline has led to a
stark class division. Well-off, educated people hardly smoke anymore
at all, whereas there are still high rates of smoking at the lower reach-
es of the economic ladder. This suggests that class circumstance may
have as much of an impact upon the decision to smoke as does freely
undertaken individual deliberation. Again, were society to have more
of a case in making diet and its consequences an individual matter,
it would have to do a lot more than it currently does in sending con-
sumers mixed messages, e.g. by promoting healthy eating while reg-
ulating the market for unhealthy foods quite feebly. In general, indi-
viduals do not make choices in a social and cultural vacuum. Their
choices are not determined by circumstances, but they are to a great
degree inflected by them. Separating out the portion of responsibili-
ty that stems from social causes beyond the individual’s capacity for
choice from that which can be traced back to individuals themselves
is a difficult, possibly intractable affair. Neither the position that sees
health states as entirely attributable to circumstance nor that which
sees certain consequences as entirely due to individual choices do the
complexity of the issue justice.
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A final note is necessary before leaving the range of issues sur-
rounding justice in the distribution of health-related resources. We
have up to this point been examining positions that seek to determine
the most ethical way to distribute scarce health-related resources to
the individual members of a society. Some positions in this area,
broadly inspired by utilitarian ethical principles, hold that justice in
the use of health-related resources requires that we put aside distri-
butional concerns, and use these resources in order to achieve the
greatest aggregate amount of health with the limited resources at our
disposal. We ought to try to generate as much of the good in ques-
tion, regardless of how this good is distributed. The ethical impulse
at the basis of this range of positions is that health institutions have
an ethical responsibility to produce as much of the good as possible
with the resources that have been entrusted to them for the produc-
tion of that good.
Health measurement tools such as QALYs and DALYs have been
constructed with this kind of maximizing exercise clearly in mind. For
any given allocation choice, the question is how efficient is it in gen-
erating increments of quality-adjusted life years, or disability-adjusted
life years (though proponents of these kinds of measures have recent-
ly attempted to build distributional concerns into them, for example
by factoring in people’s preferences for levels of equality/inequality in
distribution). Choices are made that yield the greatest numerical value,
irrespective of how the marginal increase is distributed across individ-
uals and groups.
Criticisms of this view have held that, in essence, aggregative con-
ceptions such as these are alternatives to justice, rather than variants
thereof. Justice requires that each individual in a society be consid-
ered as an irreducible source of moral claims (that is, the import of
the claim they make upon social resources does not depend upon the
contribution that the satisfaction of their interests makes to the aggre-
gate). Aggregative conceptions of the ethics of the allocation of health
resources on the other hand hold that a loss suffered by an individ-
ual is morally compensated by an equal or greater gain to another
individual or group of individuals.
Critics moreover hold that the individuals and groups that will tend
to see their health interests sacrificed for the good of the whole will
tend to be the most vulnerable in society – the elderly, the very ill
and those whose diseases are through no fault of their own very cost-
ly to treat, who cannot be counted on to “generate” much health, what-
ever the level of resources expended upon them – thus adding to the
general unfairness of the approach.
In response to this criticism, some defenders of maximization have
argued that distributional notions are tacitly built in to the approach.
For example, the tendency of the approach to privilege the claims of
the young can be justified on the basis of what has been termed the
“fair innings” argument (Williams 1997). We have reason according
to this view to give priority to the health claims of the young, because
older individuals have already had a greater share of years of life
than younger people. And so, looking at the matter more broadly, it
seems fair according to this view to give more importance to the
claims of the young than to those of the old, not only from the point
of view of efficiency in the use of resources, but also from the point
of view of intergenerational justice.
CONCLUSION
My intention in this essay has not been to settle any debates.
Rather, I have attempted to engage in some conceptual ground-clear-
ing that is in my view a necessary prolegomenon to the evolution
of theories of justice in the area of health. Though the paper does
not draw any substantive conclusions, it does sound some caution-
ary notes.
First, work still needs to be done in order to determine what the
distribuandum of such a theory should be. Moreover, we also need
to think about the kind of argument that will settle the issue. Is the
determination of the conception of health that should lie at the cen-
ter of theories of justice in health above all a conceptual issue,
amenable to the kinds of analytical tools that philosophers standard-
ly bring to bear in defining the contours and contents of a concept?
Or is the decision to delimit health in one way rather than another
just that, namely, a decision, one that is answerable to a number of
normative moral and political considerations.
Second, we still need clarity on the question of the degree of
inequality that a just society can or should be able to tolerate. Clearly,
the question of how to distribute the resources, services, and/or states
of being that should be at the center of our theories and institutions
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of health is partially dependent upon our decision concerning what
health is. But there are irreducible questions to do with the status
of health as a marker of equal citizenship, with the question of
whether health is somehow “special”, for example in not being
amenable to the kinds of tradeoffs that we standardly make with
respect to other goods that should constitute at least part of the debate
about how a just society should go about organizing the distribution
of health.
My hope is to have contributed at least somewhat to making clear-
er the conceptual and practical grounds upon which these two inter-
related sets of debates should proceed.
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